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Abstract
We characterize the optimal bidding strategies of local and global bidders for two
heterogenous licenses in a multi-unit simultaneous ascending auction. The global bid-
der wants to win both licenses to enjoy synergies; therefore, she bids more than her
stand-alone valuation of a license. This exposes her to the risk of losing money even
when she wins all licenses. We determine the optimal bidding strategies in the presence
of an exposure problem. By using simulation methods, first, we show the frequency
of inefficient allocation in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, we show that
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism may generate more revenue than the
simultaneous ascending auction.
JEL Codes:D44, D82
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism, Expo-
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1 Introduction
In a typical American or Canadian spectrum license auction, hundreds of (heterogenous)
licenses are sold simultaneously. Each of these licences gives the spectrum usage right of
a geographical area to the winning firm. Some ‘local’ firms are interested in winning only
specific licenses in order to serve local markets while other ‘global’ firms are interested in
winning all the licenses in order to serve nationwide.1 The global firms enjoy synergies if they
win all the licenses which gives them an incentive to bid over their stand-alone valuations
for some licenses. As a result, there is a risk of incurring losses. Therefore, global bidders
lower their bids. This is known as the exposure problem.2
In a model simplifying the American and the recent Canadian spectrum license auctions,
we derive the optimal bidding strategies of local and global firms in a simultaneous ascending
auction (SAA) of two licenses. We mainly focus on the optimal bidding strategies when there
is the possibility of an exposure problem (i.e., ex-post loss) since managers of cell-phone
companies and policy makers would be interested in such numbers. Through simulations,
we determine how frequently the exposure problem occurs. In addition, we decompose the
frequency into two cases; the case in which the exposure problem occurs when the global
bidder wins only one license, and the case in which the exposure problem occurs when the
global bidder wins all licenses.
Exposure problem indicates that the allocation may not be efficient. In fact, we show
that allocation may be inefficient with 7.84 per cent of the time for some parameter space.
We compare the efficiency and revenue properties of the simultaneous ascending auction
with those of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism when bidders are allowed to bid
on packages. VCG is an efficient auction that gives the highest revenue among all incentive
compatible, individually rational, efficient auctions. In the literature, there are examples
1In the recent Canadian Advanced Wireless Spectrum auction, firms such as Globalive and Rogers were
interested in all licenses whereas firms such as Bragg Communication and Manitoba Telecom Services (MTS)
were interested in East Coast and Manitoba licenses, respectively.
2We will interchangeably use exposure problem as follows. We say that an exposure problem occurred
whenever the global bidder incurs a loss ex-post.
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which show that VCG mechanism may give extreme low revenue in complete information
settings, and low revenue is cited as one of the main reasons why VCG mechanism is not
used prevalently (e.g., Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)). We show that VCG mechanism may
give higher revenue to the seller for many parameter spaces and various distributions in
incomplete information setting. For example, when local bidders win the licenses in the
SAA auction and the allocation is inefficient, then VCG auction would give higher revenue
for the same private valuations. However, when the global bidder wins the license with an
ex-post loss (that is, when exposure problem occurs), then SAA auction’s revenue would be
higher than the VCG mechanism. In this paper, we also show the frequency of inefficient
allocation when simultaneous ascending auction is used.
The multi-unit auction literature generally assumes that global bidders have either equal
valuations (Englmaier et. al (2009), Kagel and Levin (2005), Katok and Roth (2004), Albano
et. al. (2001), Rosenthal and Wang (1996), and Krishna and Rosenthal (1996)) or very large
synergies (Albano et al. (2006)). The spectrum licenses for different geographic areas are
not homogenous objects; hence, the equal valuation assumption does not fit the Canadian or
the American spectrum license auction. Moreover, in a heterogeneous license environment,
bidders may not drop out of both auctions simultaneously. This enables us to analyze
bidding behavior in the remaining auction, and hence, the exposure problem/ex-post loss. In
addition, unlike the aforementioned multi-unit auction papers above, we allow for moderate
synergies, and our focus is on the exposure problem and the comparison of revenue and
efficiency properties of the simultaneous ascending auction with those of the VCG auction.
In our paper, the global bidder will lower his bid because of the exposure problem; however,
their optimal strategy still requires him to bid over his stand alone valuation for at least one
license. If he wins this license by receiving a potential loss, then he may need to stay in the
other license auction to minimize his loss. Therefore, there are cases in which the ex-post
loss may occur even when the bidder wins all the licenses.
Goerre and Lien (2010) assume that the marginal valuation of winning a given number
of licenses is the same regardless of the composition of the particular licenses. Hence, they
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find that the optimal drop out price is the same for both licenses. In our paper, marginal
valuations are different; hence, the global bidder has a preference over license A and license B.
Specifically, we model situations in which winning the spectrum license for, say, Iowa City is
different than winning the license for New York city. Hence, our paper shows that the optimal
drop out price is not the same. In addition, through simulations, we show the frequency of
inefficient allocation and ex-post loss for the simultaneous ascending auction. Like Goerre
and Lien (2010), we find VCG mechanism may give higher revenue than the simultaneous
ascending auction. However, we show that VCG mechanism gives higher revenue for cases
in which local bidders win licenses inefficiently (in the SAA auction), and SAA auction
gives higher revenue for cases in which global bidder wins licenses inefficiently.3 In other
words, because of the ex-post loss possibility, global bidder does not bid too much over
the stand alone valuation; hence, local bidders win inefficiently. This lowers the revenue.
However, global bidder still over-bids and wins licenses with ex-post loss when local bidders
are supposed to win in an efficient outcome. This increases the revenue of SAA auction
compared to VCG auction at the expense of global bidder.
2 The Model
There are 2 licenses, license 퐴 and 퐵 for sale.4 There are one global bidder who demands
both licenses and 푚푗 = 푚− 1 local bidders who demand only license 푗 = 퐴,퐵. We explain
in detail the cases with more than one global bidder later in the paepr. Specifically, 푚푗 will
denote the number of active local bidders on the auction.5 Both local bidders and the global
bidder have a private stand alone valuation for a single license, 푣푖푗, where 푖 and 푗 represent
the bidder and the license, respectively. The valuations 푣푖푗 are drawn from the continuous
distribution function 퐹 (푣푖푗) with support on [0, 1] and probability density function 푓(푣푖푗)
which is positive everywhere with the only exception that 푓(0) ≥ 0 is allowed. The bidders’
3Zheng (2008) is mainly interested in showing that jump-bidding will alleviate the exposure problem. We
do not allow jump-bidding as the Canadian and the American spectrum auction has not allowed this.
4We use two licenses like Albano et. al. (2001 and 2006), Brusco and Lopomo (2002), Chow and Yavas
(2009), and Menucicci (2003).
5Allowing different number of local bidders per license will not change our qualitative results.
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type, global or local, is publicly known.
We consider a setting where the licenses are auctioned off simultaneously through an
ascending multi-unit auction. Each license is auctioned off at a different auction (like Krishna
and Rosenthal (1996) but unlike Kagel and Levin (2005)) but at the same time. Prices start
from zero for both licenses and increase simultaneously and continuously at the same rate.
Bidders choose when to drop out. When only one bidder is left on a given license, the clock
stops for that license, and the sole remaining bidder wins the license at the price at which the
last bidder dropped out. If there are more than one bidder remaining on the other license,
its price will continue to increase. If n bidders drop out at the same price and nobody is left
in the auction, then each one of them will win the license with probability 1
푛
. This is a zero
measure event given the valuations are drawn from a continuous distribution function.
The drop-out decision is irreversible. Once a bidder drops out of bidding for a given
license, he cannot bid for this license later.6 The number of active bidders and the drop-
out prices are publicly known. We also assume that there is no budget constraints for the
bidders.
We assume that there is a homogeneous positive synergy for the global bidder. Specifi-
cally, letting bidder 1 be the global bidder, the global bidder’s total valuation, given that it
wins two licenses is, 푉1 = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼, where the synergy term 훼 is assumed to be strictly
positive and public knowledge.7 His stand-alone valuation of license A or B is given by 푣1퐴
or 푣1퐵. Bidder 푖퐴, 푖 = 2, 3, ...푚 is only interested in license A, and her private valuation
is 푣푖퐴. Bidder 푖퐵 is only interested in license B, and her private valuation is 푣푖퐵.
8 A local
bidder who is interested in license 푗 participates only in license 푗 auction.
We derive a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium through a series of lemmas that
follow. First, we describe the equilibrium strategy of the local bidder.
6In the real-world auctions, there is activity rule. If the bidders do not have enough highest standing
bids, then the number of licenses they may bid on is decreased (in the next rounds). Hence, when there are
two licenses, this translates into an irreversible drop-out.
7Public knowledge assumption can be removed, and all results are still valid. We assume public knowledge
not to complicate the notation.
8We do not assume that 푣푖퐴 > 푣푖퐵 since local firms are different; hence, their efficiency may differ.
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Lemma 1 Each local bidder has a weakly dominant strategy to stay in the auction until the
price reaches his stand alone valuation.
This is a well-known result so we skip the proof.
Now, consider a subgame in which all the local bidder drops out of license 퐵 auction,
and hence, the global bidder wins license 퐵 at the price 푝퐵, which in equilibrium is equal
to 푝퐵 = 푚푎푥{푣2퐵, ..., 푣(푚)퐵} by lemma 1. Then, as the price for license A increases, the
global bidder will compare the payoff from dropping out from license 퐴 auction at the clock
price 푝 (which is 푣1퐵 − 푝퐵) and the payoff from winning license A at price 푝 (which is
푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼− 푝퐵− 푝). The updated optimal drop out price, 푝퐴, is found by equating these
two equations: 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝퐵 − 푝퐴 = 푣1퐵 − 푝퐵 ⇒ 푝퐴 = 푣1퐴 + 훼. This is intuitive since
by winning license A, the global bidder will also earn the synergy value. If global bidder
wins license 퐴 first, the updated optimal drop out price can be found symmetrically, and it
is 푝퐵 = 푣1퐵 + 훼. We state this as lemma 2.
Lemma 2 If the global bidder wins license 퐵 (or 퐴) first, then it will stay in license 퐴 (or
퐵) auction until the price reaches 푣1퐴 + 훼 (or 푣1퐵 + 훼)
The global bidder will not drop out before the price reaches his minimum of stand-alone
valuations. Otherwise, they will lose the chance of winning both licenses and enjoying the
synergy. In addition, if the global bidder’s average valuation, 푉1
2
= 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼
2
, exceeds 1,
bidding up to his average valuation will shut out the local bidders since local bidders’ stand
alone valuation can be at most 1. If 훼 is large enough, this condition will always be satisfied.
In such a case, the global bidder always wins both licenses in equilibrium. We summarize
these results as lemma 3.
Lemma 3 a) The global bidder stays in both license auctions at least until the price reaches
the minimum of his stand-alone valuations.
b) If his average valuation is greater than 1, the global bidder’s equilibrium strategy is to
stay in until the price reaches his average valuation.
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To calculate the optimal drop out price for the global bidder, consider first the case in
which 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵.
9 The global bidder must compare the payoffs for two cases at each price p
as the clock is running: Case 1 is the payoff from dropping out from license B auction at
price 푝 and optimally continuing on license A auction. Case 2 is the payoff from winning
license B at price p and optimally continuing on license A auction.10 At the beginning of
the auction, that is 푝 = 0, the second case payoff is higher so the global bidder will start by
staying in the auction. We show that the difference between these two cases are monotonic
in 푝 ; therefore, there is a unique price that makes the global bidder indifferent between these
two cases (assuming that the local bidders are still active).11 This is the optimal drop out
price, 푝∗1. We show that this price can be calculated at the beginning of the auction. Note
that according to Lemma 3, 푝∗1 ≥ 푣1퐵, and the optimal updated drop out price for license A,
after winning license 퐵 at price 푝, is 푣1퐴 + 훼.
We denote the expected profit of the global bidder for Case 1 by 퐸Π11 and his expected
profit for Case 2 by 퐸Π21, respectively.
Let 푝퐴 = max{푣2퐴, ..., 푣푚퐴} be the price the global bidder will pay for the license A, if
he wins license A. Payoffs are as follows:
퐸Π11 =푀푎푥{0,
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
(푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴} (1)
퐸Π21 =
∫ 푀푖푛{푣1퐴+훼,1}
푝
(푉1 − 푝− 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 +
∫ 1
푀푖푛{푣1퐴+훼,1}
(푣1퐵 − 푝)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 (2)
The explanation of equation 1 is as follows. After the global bidder drops out of the
auction for license B at 푝, it becomes just like a local bidder, and hence, will continue to
9The other case can be calculated symmetrically.
10Assuming that it has not won license A yet, the global bidder will drop out of license B first -or at the
same time as A- since 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵 . It would not make sense to drop out from license 퐴 first -since the prices
of both auctions increase at the same rate-, and then continuing on the less valued license 퐵.
11Another way of calculating the optimal drop out price would be to maximize the expected payoff.
However, this way would be much more complex; especially proving the second order conditions. Hence, we
exploit the fact that payoff difference above is monotonic in 푝. Our results coincide with the literature when
the licenses are identical.
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stay in the auction for license A until 푣1퐴. If he wins, he will pay 푝퐴 since the local bidder
with highest valuation of license A will drop out last (by Lemma 1). In order to calculate
his expected profit, global bidder will be using 퐺(푝퐴∣푝) (highest order statistic) which is the
distribution function of the local bidders’ highest valuation 푝퐴 for license A given 푝. When
there are 푚− 1 local bidders in license 퐴, the distribution function 퐺(푝퐴∣푝) and its density
function 푔(푝퐴∣푝) are:
퐺(푝퐴∣푝) = (퐹 (푝퐴∣푝))푚−1 = (
∫ 푝퐴
푝
푓(푣)푑푣∫ 1
푝
푓(푣)푑푣
)푚−1 (3)
푔(푝퐴∣푝) = (푚− 1)(
∫ 푝퐴
푝
푓(푣)푑푣∫ 1
푝
푓(푣)푑푣
)푚−2(
푓(푝퐴)∫ 1
푝
푓(푣)푑푣
). (4)
The first term of 퐸Π21 is Firm 1’s expected profit of winning both licenses; assuming that
he wins license B at the price 푝. If the highest local bidder’s valuation 푝퐴 is less than the
global bidder’s (updated) willingness to pay, 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the global bidder wins license A
and pays 푝퐴. Since 푝퐴 < 1, we use the minimum function in the upper limit of the first
integral. The second term of 퐸Π21 is Firm 1’s expected profit of winning only license B which
can happen only if 푝퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼. Note that the second term is non-positive by Lemma 3
(which is the exposure problem arising from winning only one license).
In Lemma 4 below, we characterize the global bidder’s equilibrium bids. It can be found
from 퐸Π11 = 퐸Π
2
1. Note that these payoffs are changing as local bidders bidding for 퐴
are dropping out; that is, 푚 − 1 is changing. Therefore, the lemma below gives the global
bidder’s (updated) equilibrium drop out price as the local bidders drop out. We show, in the
proof of lemma 4, that this updated price increases as local bidders of license 퐴 drop out.12
12Local bidders B dropping out of auction does not affect this optimal drop-out price. Seemingly surprising
result arises because of two facts. First, here the assumption is 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵 so the global bidder will drop out
from license 퐵 first,- as explained in footnote 10. Second, when the global bidder makes the calculation, it
compares his payoff of dropping out from license 퐵 and continuing on 퐴 at the given decision price 푝, and
winning license 퐵 and continuing on license 퐴 at the given decision price 푝. In both cases, the number of
local bidders 퐵 have no effect on the decision. However, number of local bidders 퐴 will affect its payoff. If
푣1퐵 > 푣1퐴, then ONLY the number of local bidders 퐵 will affect the global bidder’s decision. We emphasize
that local bidders B dropping out from auction affect the game though. If there are fewer local bidders B, it
is more likely for the global bidder to win license B before the price reaches its optimal drop out price, and
then it will update the new optimal drop out price as 푣1퐴 + 훼.
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Lemma 4 Suppose that the average valuation of the global bidder is less than 1 and there
are 푚− 1 local bidders bidding on license 퐴 where 푚− 1 ≥ 1 and there is at least one active
local bidder 퐵.
If 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵, the global bidder
13 will drop out of license B auction at the unique optimal
drop-out price 푝∗1 ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies 퐸Π11 = 퐸Π21. Moreover,
a) If 푣1퐴+훼 < 1, and
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴+(푣1퐵− 푣1퐴) < 0, then 푝∗1 < 푣1퐴 and the global
bidder will stay in license A auction until 푣1퐴 (after dropping out from license B auction).
b) If 푣1퐴+훼 < 1, and
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴+(푣1퐵 − 푣1퐴) > 0, then 푝∗1 > 푣1퐴 and the global
bidder will also drop out of license A auction at 푝∗1.
c) If 푣1퐴 + 훼 > 1, and
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 + (푣1퐵 + 훼− 1) < 0, then 푝∗1 < 푣1퐴 and the global
bidder will stay in license A auction until 푣1퐴 (after dropping out from license B auction).
d) If 푣1퐴 + 훼 > 1, and
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 + (푣1퐵 + 훼− 1) > 0, then 푝∗1 > 푣1퐴 and the global
bidder will also drop out of license A auction at 푝∗1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are ready to summarize our Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 5 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium)
a) Local bidder of each license will stay in the auction 푗 until price reaches their valuation
푣푖푗 where 푗 = {퐴,퐵}, 푖 = {2, 3, ..푚− 1}.
b) A global bidder active only on license 푗 will bid 푣1푗 + 훼, if he won license −푗 other
than license 푗. He will bid 푣1푗 when he did not win license −푗.
c) When 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵 and the average valuation is less than one, the global bidder who is
active on both licenses and facing 푚− 1 active local bidders on license 퐴 will drop out from
license 퐵 at the price that equates equations 1 and 2.
d) When 푣1퐴 < 푣1퐵 and the average valuation is less than one, the global bidder who is
active on both licenses and facing 푚− 1 active local bidders on license 퐵 will drop out from
license 퐴 at the price that equates equations 1 and 2 (symmetrically replaced 푣1퐴 with 푣1퐵).
13If 푣1퐴 < 푣1퐵 , then the proposition has to be written symmetrically
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e) If the average valuation is greater than one, the global bidder will stay in both auctions
until price reaches his average valuation.14
f) Out-of-equilibrium-path beliefs: When a bidder drops out, the other bidders will see
this as an equilibrium behavior. Hence, any out of equilibrium path beliefs can be used.15
At the beginning of the game, each bidder calculates its optimal drop-out price. For local
bidders, the optimal drop out prices are their valuations. In equilibrium, it is optimal for
the global bidder to stay in the auctions for both licenses up to his optimal drop-out price
calculated in Lemma 4. When his average valuation exceeds 1, he will stay until this average
valuation and win both licenses. When the price reaches the minimum of these optimal
drop-out prices, that bidder drops out of license auction. If, for example, the global bidder
wins license 퐴, the global bidder would continue to stay in the auction for license A until
the price reaches 푣1퐴+훼. At this price, he finds that the payoff from winning only license B
is more than the payoff from winning both licenses even though it will enjoy synergy; hence,
it drops out.
The following is a corollary of Lemma 4, and is an example for the optimal drop out price
when 퐹 (.) is a uniform distribution.
Corollary 6 Assume that valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution with a support
[0, 1]. In addition, assume that 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵 (other case is symmetrically found by exchanging
14Price does not have to stop increasing at 1.
15If local bidders drop out, global bidder will think that local bidder is using his/her equilibrium strategy
of dropping out at his/her valuation. If the global bidder drops out from license 퐵 first (or license 퐴 first),
the local bidders will think that global bidder is using his/her equilibrium strategy of dropping out from
license 퐵 since he has a valuation of 푣1퐵 > 푣1퐴 (or 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵) If global bidder drop out from both licenses,
then local bidders will again think that global bidder uses his equilibrium strategy and 푝∗1 > 푣1퐴, 푣1퐵 . In
other words, sequential rationality is always satisfied.
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0 푣1퐵 푝퐵 푝
∗
1 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝퐵
When 푝퐴 is here,
global bidder wins both
but makes a loss
Exposure Problem II
푣1퐴 + 훼
When 푝퐴 is here,
global bidder wins B
and makes a loss
Exposure Problem I
1
Figure 1: EXPOSURE PROBLEM
푣1퐴 with 푣1퐵), and there is one local bidder in each license.
푝∗1 =
⎧⎨⎩
1
2{푣1퐵 + 훼+ 1−(푣21퐵 + 1− 2푣1퐵 − 훼2 + 2푣1퐵훼+ 2훼− 4푣1퐴훼)
1
2 },
if 0 < 푣1퐴 < 1− 훼 and 2(1− 푣1퐴)(푣1퐴 − 푣1퐵) > 훼2;
1
3{푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼+ 1− ((푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼+ 1)2 − 3(푣1퐴 + 훼)2 − 6푣1퐵)
1
2 },
if 0 < 푣1퐴 < 1− 훼 and 2(1− 푣1퐴)(푣1퐴 − 푣1퐵) ≤ 훼2;
1
2{푣1퐵 + 훼+ 1−{(푣1퐵 + 훼+ 1)2 − 4(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼) + 2 + 2푣21퐴}
1
2 },
if 1− 훼 ≤ 푣1퐴 < 1 and 1 + 푣1퐴 > 2(푣1퐵 + 훼);
2(푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼)−1
3 ,
if 1− 훼 ≤ 푣1퐴 < 1 and 1 + 푣1퐴 ≤ 2(푣1퐵 + 훼).
(5)
The optimal drop-out price is a function that takes a unique value defined in the corollary
above. For example, case 0 < 푣1퐴 < 1 − 훼 and 2(1 − 푣1퐴)(푣1퐴 − 푣1퐵) > 훼2 implies that
푝∗1 < 푣1퐴. If we assumed 푣1퐴 = 푣1퐵, then our equilibrium drop out price in the corollary
would coincide with the equilibrium drop out prices of Albano et. al (2001) and Goerre
and Yuanchuan (2010). Hence, we generalize their results, and relax the identical valuations
assumption.
2.1 Exposure Problem/Ex-post Loss
We now can discuss the exposure problem with the help of Figure 1. In the first type of
exposure problem, the global bidder may win license B at a price above his stand alone
valuation (i.e., 푣1퐵 < 푝퐵 < 푝
∗
1) and lose the other license (i.e., 푝퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼). This is the
type of exposure problem Chakraborty (2004) focuses on. In the second type of exposure
problem, the global bidder wins both licenses but incurs a loss. This is the case when he
wins license B at 푣1퐵 < 푝퐵 < 푝
∗
1 and wins license A at 푣1퐴 + 훼 > 푝퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼 + 푣1퐵 − 푝퐵.
Note that if he wins license A at the price 푣1퐴 + 훼+ 푣1퐵 − 푝퐵, his payoff is zero. The global
bidder stays in the auction for license A in order to minimize its loss from winning only
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Table 1: PROBABILITY OF EXPOSURE PROBLEM
Percentage of Percentage of Total Percentage of
Exposure Problem 1 Exposure Problem 2 Percentage Inefficiency
Synergy One One One One
훼 Local Bidder Local Bidder Local Bidder Local Bidder
Beta Distribution with parameters 훼 = 1 and 훽 = 4
0.2 2.85 0.64 3.48 7.84
0.4 2.29 2.43 4.72 5.45
0.6 0.54 1.59 2.13 2.15
0.8 0.04 0.62 0.66 0.66
Uniform Distribution
0.2 1.17 0.40 1.57 3.29
0.4 1.13 1.07 2.20 4.22
0.6 0.69 1.51 2.20 4.01
0.8 0.36 1.25 1.61 2.62
Beta Distribution with parameters 훼 = 4 and 훽 = 1.
0.2 0.34 0.77 1.11 2.72
0.4 0.20 0.93 1.13 1.95
0.6 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.64
0.8 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.28
license 퐵 even if the price passes 푣1퐴 + 훼 + 푣1퐵 − 푝퐵.
2.2 Simulations
In this subsection, through simulations, we determine the probability of the occurrence of
ex-post loss for the global bidder and the inefficient allocation under various environments.
As we noted, we say that exposure problem occurs when the global bidder wins one or both
licenses with a loss ex-post. We have used MATLAB to write our simulation code. This code
first draws the valuations for both the global and the local bidders from a given distribution
function. We have one local bidder on each license and one global bidder on both licenses.
One set of valuations correspond to one auction. We calculate the optimal drop-out price
of the global bidder; local bidders’ drop-out prices are their valuations. The global bidder’s
equilibrium drop-out price is updated as these local bidders drop out from the auction. If
the global bidder does not win the first license, then no exposure problem occurs. If he wins
12
the first license, then we calculate his updated price for the remaining license (unless the
global bidder drops out from both licenses at the same time). We next determine whether
the global bidder will win the remaining license at a positive profit (no exposure problem),
at a loss (exposure problem II) or lose the remaining license (exposure problem I). Dividing
the number of each of these events to the number of draws yields the probability of each
event.16
We use three different distribution functions to draw valuations: uniform, beta distri-
bution with 훼 = 1, and 훽 = 4, and beta distribution with 훼 = 4 and 훽 = 1. The second
distribution is first order stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution, while the
third one first order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution. We use one local
bidder on each license.17 We run simulations for four different synergy levels: 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,
0.8.18 The 0.2 represents for small synergy, 0.4 and 0.6 represents middle synergy, and 0.8
represents a large synergy level. We report the results in TABLE 1.
We find that the global bidder may face exposure problem with probability 4.72 per cent,
if the valuations are drawn from beta distribution with parameters 훼 = 1 and 훽 = 4, and the
synergy level is equal to 0.4. Note that the expected stand alone valuation for each license
is 0.2 with this distribution. Hence, the global bidder’s average valuation does not exceed 1
most of the time which result in more inefficient allocation and ex-post loss.
TABLE 1 also shows that the exposure problem occurs with the smallest probability
among all these different distributions when the synergy level is 0.8. This is expected since
the global bidder, after winning the first license, can bid very high for the remaining license
(in most cases more than 1) but do not incur a loss due to high synergy level.
16In our simulation, to simplify calculations, we only consider cases in which the global bidder values the
license A more than license B. After 10000 draws, we select only the valuations where the global bidder’s
valuation for license A is greater than license B. Hence, we are left with approximately 5000 draws. We used
UNIX system of the University of Manitoba, and our laptops for the simulations. In the UNIX machine, it
took more than four days to run each code.
17Given the complexity of the code we use, we feel that using one local bidder in our simulations are enough
to draw reasonable conclusions though this can be extended to two local bidders in each license. Using three
local bidders or more would extremely complicate the code since one has to keep track of updated prices
every time a local bidder drops off.
18We also write codes for a finer synergy level of 0.1,0.2,...0.9 but we do not report them since no new
insight is learned.
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Figure 2: Valuations are drawn from Uniform Distribution.
In our simulations, Exposure problem I occurred most often when the synergy level is
0.4. In this case, the global bidder overbids to enjoy the middle level synergy, so he is very
likely to make a substantial (potential) loss when he wins the first license. His optimal drop-
out price for the remaining license is generally below 1; hence, the risk of losing the second
license is high. Exposure problem II generally occurs the most when the synergy level is 0.6.
After winning the first license, the global bidder will stay in the remaining license auction
for a higher drop out price; hence, rather than exposure problem I, exposure problem II is
likely to occur.
Of the two beta distribution, the one with 훽 = 1 and the one with 훽 = 4, we observe
that the exposure problem occurs much less frequently with the first one. The reason is that
with the former one, the valuations of the global bidder is likely to be higher; hence, even
with a small synergy level, their optimal updated drop out price after winning one license
is more than 1 in most cases. Therefore, it is less likely to have exposure problem. On the
other hand, when the global bidder’s updated optimal price is less than one, it is also more
likely that the local bidder’s valuation will be high so in such cases, one may see exposure
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problem. As the synergy increases, this case is less likely to happen.
In TABLE 1, we show that, for the Beta distribution with 훽 = 1, the allocation is
inefficient 7.84 per cent of the time when 훼 = 0.2. As 훼 increases, global bidder wins both
licenses more often without facing exposure problem that much, and this is the efficient
outcome. Hence, we observe inefficient allocation only 0.66 per cent of the time for 훼 = 0.8.
Most of the inefficiency is due to exposure problem.
We will talk about the role of inefficiency on revenue in the next section. Especially,
when the inefficiency is due to exposure problem and when it is due to local bidders winning
licenses inefficiently.
Before closing this section, we quickly talk about TABLE 2 which shows the optimal drop
out prices for three different distributions. When the local bidders’ valuation is expected to
be low (when 훽 = 4), optimal drop out price is higher compared to the cases where the local
bidder’s valuation is expected to be high (when 훽 = 1).
3 Comparison with Vickrey Clarke Groves Auction
In this section, we will compare the revenue of our auction with the revenue of Vickrey Clarke
Groves (VCG) auction.19 VCG auction maximizes the expected payment of each agent
among all mechanisms for allocating multiple objects that are efficient, incentive compatible,
and individually rational.20 In this auction, the seller will let the bidders bid on license A,
license B and the whole package license A and B.
We, will first calculate the payment of each winner for all cases; that is, calculate the
revenue of the seller. The payment of a winner (say player i) in this auction is the difference
between the social welfare of the others if the bidder did not participate in the auction
(denote this as 푊−푖(푥−푖) where 푥−푖 denote the bid of all players other than player 푖), and
the welfare of the others when he participated in the auction, and bid truthfully (denote
this as 푊−푖(푥), where 푥 denote the bid of all players.) since truthful bidding is the weakly
19In the literature, there are many papers on VCG mechanism but not interested in exposure problem
aspect such as Sano (2011) and Misra and PArkes (2009)
20See proposition 16.2 of Krishna (2010). In this section, we follow the notation of Krishna (2010) closely.
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Table 2: OPTIMAL DROP OUT PRICE
Global Global Uniform Beta Beta
Bidder’s Bidder’s Distr. Distr. Distr.
Valuation Valuation with 훼 = 1 with 훼 = 4
for License A for License B and 훽 = 4 and 훽 = 1
푣1퐴 푣1퐵 푝
푈
1 푝
훽=4
1 푝
훽=1
1
Synergy=0.2
0.25 0.2 0.231 0.2796 0.2027
0.4 0.2 0.2641 0.2958 0.2086
0.6 0.2 0.3127 0.3225 0.2276
0.8 0.2 0.3683 0.36 0.289
0.81 0.4 0.5591 0.562 0.4951
Synergy=0.4
0.25 0.2 0.2909 0.4026 0.2215
0.4 0.2 0.3528 0.4671 0.2546
0.6 0.2 0.4536 0.52 0.3524
0.8 0.2 0.5551 0.56 0.489
0.81 0.4 0.7325 0.762 0.6951
Synergy=0.6
0.25 0.2 0.3787 0.5167 0.2865
0.4 0.2 0.4667 0.5912 0.3874
0.6 0.2 0.6 0.6886 0.5524
0.8 0.2 0.7268 0.76 0.689
0.81 0.4 0.8733 0.9044 0.8839
Synergy=0.8
0.25 0.2 0.5 0.6226 0.4451
0.4 0.2 0.6 0.6981 0.5807
0.6 0.2 0.7333 0.7987 0.7401
0.8 0.2 0.8667 0.8994 0.8775
0.81 0.4 1 1 1
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Table 3: Bidders’ Valuations.
A B AB
푣1퐴 푣1퐵 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼
푣2퐴 0 푣2퐴
0 푣3퐵 푣3퐵
dominant strategy.
The table below shows the valuations of the bidders. To give an example of how payments
are calculated, let us assume that 푣2퐴 + 푣1퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 > 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵. VCG auction will
allocate license A to local bidder A, and license B to global bidder. Payment of local bidder
A is (푊−2(푥−2)) −푊−2(푥) = (푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼) − 푣1퐵 = 푣1퐴 + 훼. If local bidder A does not
participate in the auction, then global bidder will win the package; hence, the welfare of the
others 푊−2(푥−2) = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼. When it participates in the auction, global bidder gets
only license B, and local bidder B gets nothing; hence, the welfare of others in this case is
푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐵.
Payment of the global bidder is: (푊−1(푥−1))−푊−1(푥) = (푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵)− 푣2퐴 = 푣3퐵. If the
global bidder does not participate in the auction, local bidder A and B wins each license;
hence, the welfare of others is the term inside the parenthesis. When the global bidder
participates in the auction, local bidder A wins license A but the welfare of local bidder B
is zero; hence the welfare of others in this case is just 푣2퐴.
The total revenue of the seller in this case will be 푣1퐴 + 훼+ 푣3퐵.
We summarize the revenue of the seller for all cases in proposition 9 in appendix.
We compare the revenue of the simultaneous ascending auction with those of the VCG
auction through simulation methods. Our results are summarized in FIGURE 2. We run
the simulations for 훼 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and three different distributions. All results show
that VCG mechanism gives higher revenue especially when 훼 = 0.2. Therefore, unlike
the complete information examples of VCG mechanism in the literature (e.g. Ausubel and
Milgrom (2006)), we show that revenue is higher with VCG mechanism when licenses are
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Table 4: Example of Revenue Comparison for Inefficient Allocations.
푣1퐴 푣1퐵 훼 푝
∗
1 푣2퐴 푣3퐵 Revenue-Our Model Revenue-VCG Mechanism
0.0963 0.0008 0.2 0.0718 0.1581 0.1247 0.1681 = 푝∗1 + 푣1퐴 0.2829 = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵
0.1149 0.1015 0.2 0.1677 0.31 0.16 0.47 = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 0.3628 = 2(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼)− 푣2퐴 − 푣3퐵
not identical in an incomplete information setting.
When there is inefficient allocation in our auction, either global bidder wins (with
exposure problem/ex-post loss), or local bidders win when global bidders would win in VCG
auction. If most of the inefficient allocations are due to the first one, then our auction’s
revenue is expected to be higher. If most of the inefficient cases are due to the latter one,
then VCG mechanism’s revenue is expected to be higher. For example, when we look for
Beta Distribution with 훽 = 4 case, exposure problem is very high with 3.48 per cent for
the synergy level of 훼 = 0.2; however, the overall inefficiency is 7.84 per cent. We can
conclude that most inefficiency is due to local bidders winning licenses. As a result, VCG
mechanism gives a higher revenue. When 훼 = 0.6 or 훼 = 0.8, we see that most inefficiency
is due to exposure problem; hence, our auction gives a higher revenue compared to VCG
mechanism. When 훼 = 0.8, inefficiencies disappear, and not surprisingly the revenue levels
of both auctions converge.
To make our point, let us look at the sample valuations in TABLE 4. In the first row, our
auction allocates goods inefficiently to two local bidders. With VCG, however, global bidder
wins the auction, and pays a higher price. Hence, VCG auction gives a higher revenue. In
the second row, global bidder wins both licenses with an ex-post loss. Hence, the revenue of
our model is higher than VCG mechanism’s revenue.
We prove that SAA auction increases revenue for cases in which global bidder wins
licenses with ex-post loss, and VCG mechanism increases revenue for cases in which local
bidders win the licenses but the allocation is inefficient.
Proposition 7 When the global bidder wins licenses with an ex-post loss; that is, exposure
problem occurs, then revenue of the VCG auction is lower than the simultaneous ascending
auction (SAA); that is, 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
18
Proposition 8 When the local bidder wins the licenses and the allocation is inefficient, then
revenue in VCG model is greater than SAA, that is, 푅푉 퐶퐺 > 푅푆퐴퐴.
Unfortunately, one cannot say much when the allocation is efficient with SAA auction.
There are cases in which SAA auction gives higher or lower revenue than the VCG auction
in efficient allocations.
The literature writes that exposure problem lowers the revenue since the global bidder
expects that it may end up with a loss; hence, does not over bid too much. Hence, local
bidders win when the global bidder is supposed to win in an efficient auction like VCG.
While this intuition is correct, there is another side of the story. The global bidder still bids
above the stand alone valuation in a SAA auction; hence, it may end up winning licenses
with a loss. This overbidding brings higher revenue compared in SAA auction compared to
VCG auction.
4 More Than One Global Bidder
In this section, we will analyze the case where there is more than one global bidder. The
difficulty in this case arises from the fact that each global bidder’s optimal drop out price
depends on the other global bidders’ optimal drop out price which is a function of private
valuations. As a result, each global bidder, while calculating its own drop out price,
should at the same time calculate the distribution of the other global bidder’s drop
out price. This makes deriving an analytical result impossible.
To make our case, assume that there are two global bidders, Firm 1 and Firm 2, and one
local bidder on each of license A and license B which are denoted as Firm 3 and Firm 4. Let
the valuations 푣푖퐴 for 푖 = 1, 2, 3 and 푣푗퐵 for 푗 = 1, 2, 4 are drawn from the same distribution
function 퐺(.). Everything else is the same as the previous section. In addition assume that
푣푖퐵 < 푣푖퐴 for 푖 = 1, 2.
21 Firm 1 will make a similar calculation as we discussed in one global
bidder case –except that the price would depend on the drop out price of the second global
21This does not have to be true but our point is even if you assume such a restrictive assumption, you
cannot calculate the optimal drop out prices.
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Figure 3:
Uniform Distribution (Top), Beta Distribution with 훼 = 4, 훽 = 1, Beta Distribution with
훼 = 1, 훽 = 4 (Bottom)
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bidder which we denote as 푝∗2– Specifically, he should make the following calculation while
deciding to stay in the license B auction or not. This calculation is done based on a history
in which none of the other bidders have dropped out yet.
퐸Π11 =푀푎푥{0, 퐸
[
([
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
(푣1퐴 −푀푎푥{푣2퐴, 푣3퐴}푃 (푝∗2 < 푣4퐵))푑퐺(푀푎푥{푣2퐴, 푣3퐴}∣푝) (6)
+
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
(푣1퐴 −푀푎푥{(푣2퐴 + 훼), 푣3퐴}푃 (푝∗2 > 푣4퐵))푑퐺(푀푎푥{(푣2퐴 + 훼), 푣3퐴}∣푝)])∣푝∗2
]
} (7)
퐸Π21 =
∫ 푀푖푛{푣1퐴+훼,1}
푝
(푉1−푝−푝퐴)푑퐺(푀푎푥{푣2퐴, 푣3퐴}∣푝)+
∫ 1
푀푖푛{푣1퐴+훼,1}
(푣1퐵−푝)푑퐺(푀푎푥{푣2퐴, 푣3퐴}∣푝)
(8)
The explanation of equation 5 is as follows. If this global bidder drops out from license
B before the other global and local bidders, then it will continue on license A auction as a
local bidder. Hence, it can only derive a benefit of 푣1퐴 if it wins the license. The price it will
pay for license A depends on the result of whether the local or the other global bidder wins
license B. If the local bidder B wins license B (this happens with probability 푃 (푝∗2 < 푣4퐵)
and we integrate this in the range 푝 to 푣1퐴), then the price of license A will be the maximum
of local bidder A’s valuation and the other global bidder’s valuation for license which is
푀푎푥{푣2퐴, 푣3퐴}. Expectation is taken with respect to 푝∗2.
Equation 7 analyze the case in which the other global bidder wins license B. This happens
with probability 푃 (푝∗2 > 푣4퐵) (in the range 푝 to 푣1퐴), then it can enjoy synergy and will bid
until 푣2퐴 + 훼 for license A. Then, the price global bidder 1 will pay is 푀푎푥{(푣2퐴 + 훼), 푣3퐴}.
Equation 8 analyzes the case in which Firm 1 wins license B, and then continue optimally
on license A. This is the same as “one global bidder” case. The only difference is that the
other global bidder is now a local bidder; hence, there is one more local bidder in the license
A auction compared to the “one global case”.
When we equate these integrals, we will find 푝∗1(푣1퐴, 푣1퐵, 훼, 푝
∗
2(푣2퐴, 푣2퐵, 훼)). Global bid-
der, Firm 1, does not know 푣2퐴 and 푣2퐵, and hence, 푝
∗
2. Since 푝
∗
2 is not known, Firm 1 must
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use its distribution which he does not even know the functional form. At the same time,
the other global bidder, Firm 2, is making a similar calculation; however, he does not know
푝∗1(푣1퐴, 푣1퐵, 훼, 푝
∗
2(푣2퐴, 푣2퐵, 훼)). In other words, two global bidders will have two non-linear
equations 푝∗1(푣1퐴, 푣1퐵, 훼, 푝
∗
2(푣2퐴, 푣2퐵, 훼)) and 푝
∗
2(푣2퐴, 푣2퐵, 훼, 푝
∗
1(푣1퐴, 푣1퐵, 훼)) that should be si-
multaneously solved, and to calculate these equations, they need to calculate the distribution
of 푝∗푖 for 푖 = 1, 2. We are not sure whether this can be solved through simulations so it is
left as an open problem.22
5 Conclusion and Discussion
We showed the optimal bidding strategies of global bidders when there are moderate synergies
and the licenses are heterogeneous. We also analyzed exposure problem and its role on
revenue extensively. Our revenue comparison of SAA and VCG auctions show that VCG
mechanism gives a higher revenue when the synergy level is low.
We were able to show exposure problem can occur even when the global bidder wins all
licenses. Literature has not studied heterogeneous license case with moderate synergies since
it is technically challenging when one uses more than one global bidder. With this paper,
we fill this gap. One of our contributions is to write a complicated code to calculate the
probability of exposure problem. Our simulation results show that the exposure problem
may be minor for some distributions but may be up to 4.3 per cent for some others.
Extending the results to 푛 global bidders would be very complicated since the optimal
strategies of global bidders (optimal drop out prices) should be determined jointly which in
turn would depend on how many local and how many global bidders are still in the auction.
Moreover, one has to know the distribution of the other global bidder’s optimal drop out
price while calculating the optimal drop out price! We leave this as an open problem, and,
in this paper we follow the literature that use only one global bidder (e.g. Kagel and Levin
(2005)).
22We suspect that other papers in the literature assumes identical licenses to avoid this problem In fact,
Albano et. al (2006) writes “In fact, for intermediate values of 훼 ∈ (0, 1) and if 푣1 푎푛푑 푣2 are differ-
ent...;showing the existence of a PBE is already problematic in this case.”
22
Our other contribution is comparing the revenue and the efficiency properties of the
simultaneous ascending auction with those of the VCG auction. We show that when synergy
level is small (훼 = 0.2), the VCG mechanism generates more revenue. However, when
valuations are such that exposure problem occurs, then SAA auction gives a higher revenue.
When the local bidders win the license inefficiently (in SAA auction), the VCG mechanism
gives a higher revenue.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
We will prove that there is a unique optimal drop out price by solving 퐸Π11 = 퐸Π
2
1. Here,
we assume that 푣1퐵 < 푣1퐴.
23 We have four cases.
Case I: In this case, we will assume 푣1퐴+훼 < 1 and
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴+(푣1퐵−푣1퐴) < 0.
We will show that this implies 푝∗1 < 푣1퐴 (which in turn implies 퐸Π
1
1 > 0).
First, we show that there exists a unique solution that makes equations 1 and 2 equal,
and this is the optimal drop out price 푝∗1. We define a new function, 퐽(푝,푚) = 퐸Π
1
1 −퐸Π21.
To prove uniqueness, we will show that this function is monotonically increasing and it is
negative when 푝 = 푣1퐵 (by lemma 2, p cannot be less than 푣1퐵) and is positive when 푝 = 푣1퐴.
Hence, there must be a unique root at the interval 푣1퐵 < 푝 < 푣1퐴.
퐽(푝,푚) =
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
(푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
(푉1 − 푝− 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
− ∫ 1
푣1퐴+훼
(푣1퐵 − 푝)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴.
By using
∫ 1
푝
푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 = 1 since 푔(푝퐴∣푝) is a probability density function on the support
[푝, 1], we have (푣1퐵 − 푝)
∫ 1
푝
푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 = 푣1퐵 − 푝, we can re-write it as∫ 푣1퐴
푝
(푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
(푣1퐴 + 훼− 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푝)
By using integration by parts twice
∫
푢푑푣 = 푢푣 − ∫ 푣푑푢, first we assume that 푢 = 푣1퐴 − 푝퐴
and 푣 = 퐺(푝퐴∣푝); then assume that 푢 = 푣1퐴+훼−푝퐴 and 푣 = 퐺(푝퐴∣푝), thus, 푑푣 = 푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴,
23The other case, 푣1퐵 > 푣1퐴, is symmetric.
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we have
= (푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)퐺(푝퐴∣푝) ∣푣1퐴푝 −
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑(푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)
− (푣1퐴 + 훼− 푝퐴)퐺(푝퐴∣푝) ∣푣1퐴+훼푝 +
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑(푣1퐴 + 훼− 푝퐴)− (푣1퐵 − 푝)
=
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푝) = −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푝)
We take partial derivative of 퐽(푝,푚) with respect to 푝, we have,
∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푝
= ∂
∂푝
[− ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)] + 1 > 0
It is positive since the term ∂
∂푝
[
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)] is negative. As the lower limit of the
integral increases, the value of the expression decreases (does not increase) if the term inside
is non-negative which is true since it is a cumulative distribution function. We must also
show that ∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)
∂푝
≤ 0 to prove this. While one can easily see that this is correct (as p
increases the cumulative distribution conditional on p decreases), we will give a formal proof
by using Leibniz’s rule when necessary.
⇔ ∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)
∂푝
=
∂[(
∫ 푝퐴
푝 푓(푣)푑푣∫ 1
푝 푓(푣)푑푣
)푚−1]
∂푝
= −(푚− 1)푓(푝) (
∫ 푝퐴
푝 푓(푣)푑푣)
푚−2
(
∫ 1
푝 푓(푣)푑푣)
푚−1 + (푚− 1)푓(푝)
(
∫ 푝퐴
푝 푓(푣)푑푣)
푚−1
(
∫ 1
푝 푓(푣)푑푣)
푚
=
(푚−1)푓(푝)(∫ 푝퐴푝 푓(푣)푑푣)푚−2
(
∫ 1
푝 푓(푣)푑푣)
푚−1 [−1 +
∫ 푝퐴
푝 푓(푣)푑푣∫ 1
푝 푓(푣)푑푣
]
=
(푚−1)푓(푝)(∫ 푝퐴푝 푓(푣)푑푣)푚−2
(
∫ 1
푝 푓(푣)푑푣)
푚−1 [−1 + 퐹 (푝퐴∣푝)] < 0 (≤ 0 only if 푝퐴 = 1).
Thus, 퐽(푝,푚) is monotonically increasing function of 푝, when 푣1퐵 ≤ 푝 < 푣1퐴.
If 푝 = 푣1퐵, then 퐽(푣1퐵) =
∫ 푣1퐴
푣1퐵
퐺(푝퐴∣훼)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐵
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐵)푑푝퐴
= − ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐵)푑푝퐴 < 0. (note that we prove this for the case 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵)
If 푝 = 푣1퐴, 퐽(푣1퐴) = 0 −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푣1퐴) > 0, then our assumption∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 + (푣1퐵 − 푣1퐴) < 0 implies that 퐽(푝 = 푣1퐴) > 0.
Hence, there is a unique root, 푝∗1 in the such that 푣1퐵 < 푝
∗
1 < 푣1퐴.
Next, we show that as the number of active firms in license A auction decreases, the
optimal drop out price will increase. We will use the implicit function theorem for this:
⇔ 푑푝∗1
푑푚
= −
∂퐽(푝∗1,푚)
∂푚
∂퐽(푝∗1,푚)
∂푝∗1
< 0.
We have already shown that
∂퐽(푝∗1,푚)
∂푝∗1
> 0.
Since 퐽(푝,푚) =
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푝).
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Since the lower limits of the two integrals are the same, we can re-write this as 퐽(푝,푚) =
− ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푝).
By using Leibniz’s rule for differentiation under the integral sign, we take partial deriva-
tive of 퐽(푝,푚) with respect to 푚 and have,
∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푚
= − ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)
∂푚
푑푝퐴 = −
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
ln(퐹 (푝퐴∣푝))퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 > 0, since ∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)∂푚 =
ln(퐹 (푝퐴∣푝))퐺(푝퐴∣푝) < 0. Hence, we show that ∂퐽(푝∣푚)∂푚 > 0 holds.
By the implicit function theorem, we show that the optimal drop out price increases as
the number of local firms, 푚, decreases.
Since ∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푝
> 0 and ∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푚
> 0, we have,
푑푝∗1
푑푚
= −
∂퐹 (푝∗1,푚)
∂푚
∂퐹 (푝∗1,푚)
∂푝∗1
< 0
Case II: In this case, we will assume that 푣1퐴+훼 < 1 and
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴+(푣1퐵−
푣1퐴) ≥ 0 which we will show that this implies 푝∗1 ≥ 푣1퐴. And this condition in turn implies
that 퐸Π11 = 0, since the global bidder drops from both licenses.
Now let 퐽(푝,푚) = 퐸Π11 − 퐸Π21
퐽(푝,푚) = 0− ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
(푉1 − 푝− 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 1
푣1퐴+훼
(푣1퐵 − 푝)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
= − ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 − 푝).
When 푝 ≥ 푣1퐴, we take partial derivative of 퐽(푝,푚) with respect to 푝, we have,
∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푝
= − ∂
∂푝
[
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴] + 1 > 0, since ∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)∂푝 < 0.
Thus, 퐽(푝,푚) is monotonically increasing function of 푝, when 푣1퐴 ≤ 푝 ≤ 푣1퐴 + 훼.
Our assumption
∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴 + (푣1퐵 − 푣1퐴) ≥ 0 implies that 퐽(푝 = 푣1퐴,푚) ≤ 0.
If 푝 = 푣1퐴 + 훼, then 퐽(푣1퐴 + 훼) = 0 − 0 − (푣1퐵 − 푣1퐴 + 훼) > 0. Thus, there is a unique
solution, 푝∗1, in the interval [푣1퐴, 푣1퐴 + 훼).
Next, we show that when the number of active firms in license A auction decreases, this
optimal drop out price will increase.
We take partial derivative of 퐽(푝,푚) with respect to 푚, we have,
∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푚
= − ∫ 푣1퐴+훼
푝
ln(퐹 (푝퐴∣푝))퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 > 0.
Since ∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푝
> 0 and ∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푚
> 0, we have,
푑푝∗1
푑푚
= −
∂퐽(푝∗1,푚)
∂푚
∂퐽(푝∗1,푚)
∂푝∗1
< 0
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Case III: In this case, we will assume that 푣1퐴+훼 > 1 and
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴+(푣1퐵 +
훼− 1) < 0 which implies 푣1퐴 < 푝∗1. And this condition in turn implies that 퐸Π11 > 0.
Now let 퐽(푝,푚) = 퐸Π11 − 퐸Π21
퐽(푝,푚) =
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
(푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 −
∫ 1
푝
(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝− 푝퐴)푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
Again, we assume that 푢 = 푣1퐴 − 푝퐴 and 푣 = 퐺(푝퐴∣푝) for the first integral; then assume
that 푢 = 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼−푝−푝퐴 and 푣 = 퐺(푝퐴∣푝) for the second integral, thus, 푑푣 = 푔(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴,
By using integration by parts, we have
= (푣1퐴 − 푝퐴)퐺(푝퐴∣푝) ∣푣1퐴푝 +
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
− (푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝− 푝퐴)퐺(푝퐴∣푝) ∣1푝 −
∫ 1
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
=
∫ 푣1퐴
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝− 1)−
∫ 1
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
= −(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝− 1)−
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴
We take partial derivative of 퐽(푝,푚) with respect to 푝, we have,
∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푝
= ∂
∂푝
[− ∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)] + 1 > 0
It is positive since the term ∂
∂푝
[
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)] is negative. And we have shown that
∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)
∂푝
≤ 0. Thus, 퐽(푝,푚) is monotonically increasing function of 푝, when 푣1퐵 ≤ 푝 < 푣1퐴.
If 푝 = 푣1퐵, then 퐽(푣1퐵) = −
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐵)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐴 + 훼− 1) < 0 since 푣1퐴 + 훼 > 1.
If 푝 = 푣1퐴, 퐽(푣1퐴) = 0 −
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐵 + 훼 − 1) > 0 since 푣1퐵 < 푣1퐴 and
푣1퐴 + 훼 > 1, then our assumption
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴 + (푣1퐵 + 훼 − 1) < 0 implies that
퐽(푝 = 푣1퐴) > 0.
Hence, there is a unique root in the interval 푣1퐵 < 푝 < 푣1퐴.
We skip to show that as the number of active firms in license A auction decreases, the
optimal drop out price will increase, since we have done this in Case I.
Case IV: In this case, we will assume that 푣1퐴+훼 > 1 and
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴+ (푣1퐵 +
훼− 1) ≥ 0 which implies 푝∗1 ≥ 푣1퐴. And this condition in turn implies that 퐸Π11 = 0.
Now let 퐽(푝,푚) = 퐸Π11 − 퐸Π21
퐽(푝,푚) = 0− ∫ 1
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴 − (푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푝− 1).
When 푝 > 푣1퐴, we take partial derivative of 퐽(푝,푚) with respect to 푝, we have,
∂퐽(푝,푚)
∂푝
= − ∂
∂푝
[
∫ 1
푝
퐺(푝퐴∣푝)푑푝퐴] + 1 > 0, since ∂퐺(푝퐴∣푝)∂푝 < 0.
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Thus, 퐽(푝,푚) is monotonically increasing function of 푝, when 푣1퐴 ≤ 푝 ≤ 1.
Our assumption
∫ 1
푣1퐴
퐺(푝퐴∣푣1퐴)푑푝퐴 + (푣1퐵 + 훼 − 1) ≥ 0 implies that 퐽(푝 = 푣1퐴) ≤ 0. If
푝 = 1, then 퐽(1) = 0− 0− (푣1퐵 + 푣1퐴 + 훼− 2) > 0. Since 푣1퐵 + 푣1퐴 + 훼 < 2 by our average
valuation is less than 1 assumption in the lemma. Thus, there is a unique solution, 푝∗1, in
the interval [푣1퐴, 1).
We also skip to show that when the number of active firms in license A auction decreases,
this optimal drop out price will increase which has been proven in Case II.
Proposition 9 Suppose that there is one global bidder and one local bidder bidding for
each license. In the VCG auction, the seller’s revenue will be as follows depending on the
valuations of the bidders.24
CASE I: Suppose that the valuations are such that 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 < 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
A) (Local bidders win each license) And suppose that 푣1퐴 < 푣2퐴 and 푣1퐵 < 푣3퐵. There
are four sub cases to consider.
i) 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵.
ii) 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 2(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼)− 푣3퐵 − 푣2퐴.
iii) 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 2푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푣2퐴.
iv) 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 푣1퐴 + 2푣1퐵 + 훼− 푣3퐵.
B) (Local bidder wins A, and global bidder wins B) And suppose that 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 and
푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵. Then, the revenue is 푣1퐴 + 훼+ 푣3퐵.
C) (Local bidder wins B, and global bidder wins A) And suppose that 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 and
푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴. Then, the revenue is 푣1퐵 + 훼+ 푣2퐴
CASE II: Suppose that the valuations are such that 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 > 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
A) (Global bidder wins both licenses) And suppose that 푣1퐴 < 푣2퐴 and 푣1퐵 < 푣3퐵. Then,
the revenue is 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
B) (Global bidder wins both licenses) And suppose that 푣1퐴 > 푣2퐴 and 푣1퐵 > 푣3퐵. Then,
the revenue is 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
24This result can easily be extended to one global and many local bidders case. Since, we use one global
bidder and one local bidder in each license in the simulations, to save the notation, we give the result for a
special case.
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C) (Global bidder wins license A, local bidder B wins license B) And suppose that 푣2퐴 <
푣1퐴 and 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼. Then, the revenue is 푣2퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼.
D) (Global bidder wins license B, local bidder A wins license A) And suppose that 푣2퐴 >
푣1퐴 + 훼 and 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵. Then, the revenue is 푣3퐵 + 푣1퐴 + 훼.
Proof of Proposition 9 Suppose that there is one global bidder and one local bidder
bidding for each license. In the VCG auction, the seller’s revenue will be as follows depending
on the valuations of the bidders.
CASE I: Suppose that the valuations are such that 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 < 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
A) (Local bidders win each license) And suppose that 푣1퐴 < 푣2퐴 and 푣1퐵 < 푣3퐵. There
are four sub cases to consider.
i) 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵.
since local bidder A’s payment would be 푊 (푥−2)−푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐴+푣3퐵− (0+푣3퐵) = 푣1퐴
and local bidder B’s payment would be 푊 (푥−3)−푊−3(푥) = 푣1퐵 + 푣2퐴 − 푣2퐴 = 푣1퐵
ii) 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 2(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼)− 푣3퐵 − 푣2퐴.
since 푊 (푥−2)−푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼− (0+ 푣3퐵) = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼− 푣3퐵 and 푊 (푥−3)−
푊−3(푥) = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− (0 + 푣2퐴) = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푣2퐴
iii) 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 2푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푣2퐴.
since 푊 (푥−2) − 푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐴 + 푣3퐵 − (0 + 푣3퐵) = 푣1퐴, and 푊 (푥−3) − 푊−3(푥) =
푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− (0 + 푣2퐴) = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼− 푣2퐴
iv) 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼 and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼, then the revenue is 푣1퐴 + 2푣1퐵 + 훼− 푣3퐵.
since 푊 (푥−2)−푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼− (0+ 푣3퐵) = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼− 푣3퐵 and 푊 (푥−3)−
푊−3(푥) = 푣1퐵 + 푣2퐴 − 푣2퐴 = 푣1퐵
B) (Local bidder wins A, and global bidder wins B) And suppose that 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 and
푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵. Then, the revenue is 푣1퐴 + 훼+ 푣3퐵.
since 푊 (푥−2)−푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼− (0+ 푣1퐵) = 푣1퐴+훼, and 푊 (푥−1)−푊−1(푥) =
푣3퐵 + 푣2퐴 − 푣2퐴 = 푣3퐵
C) (Local bidder wins B, and global bidder wins A) And suppose that 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 and
푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵. Then, the revenue is 푣1퐵 + 훼 + 푣2퐴
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since 푊 (푥−3)−푊−3(푥) = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼− (0+ 푣1퐴) = 푣1퐵 +훼, and 푊 (푥−1)−푊−1(푥) =
푣3퐵 + 푣2퐴 − 푣3퐵 = 푣2퐴
CASE II: Suppose that the valuations are such that 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 > 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
A) (Global bidder wins both licenses) And suppose that 푣1퐴 < 푣2퐴 and 푣1퐵 < 푣3퐵. Then,
the revenue is 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
since 푊 (푥−1)−푊−1(푥) = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 − (0 + 0) = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
B) (Global bidder wins both licenses) And suppose that 푣1퐴 > 푣2퐴 and 푣1퐵 > 푣3퐵. Then,
the revenue is 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
since 푊 (푥−1)−푊−1(푥) = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 − (0 + 0) = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
C) (Global bidder wins license A, local bidder B wins license B) And suppose that
푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 and 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼. Then, the revenue is 푣2퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼.
since 푊 (푥−1) −푊−1(푥) = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 − (푣3퐵 + 0) = 푣2퐴 and 푊 (푥−3) −푊−3(푥) = 푣1퐴 +
푣1퐵 + 훼− (푣1퐴 + 0) = 푣1퐵 + 훼.
D) (Global bidder wins license B, local bidder A wins license A) And suppose that
푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼 and 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵. Then, the revenue is 푣3퐵 + 푣1퐴 + 훼.
since 푊 (푥−1) −푊−1(푥) = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 − (푣2퐴 + 0) = 푣3퐵 and 푊 (푥−2) −푊−2(푥) = 푣1퐴 +
푣1퐵 + 훼− (푣1퐵 + 0) = 푣1퐴 + 훼.
Proof of Proposition 7 When there is an exposure problem, then revenue in VCG
model, 푅푉 퐶퐺, is lower than revenue in SAA, 푅푆퐴퐴.
First, we consider when there is type 1 exposure problem, there are cases:
Case 1: when 푣1퐵 < 푣3퐵 < 푝
∗
1 (global bidder wins license 퐵 with a loss), and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴+훼
(but loses license 퐴), then 푅푆퐴퐴 = 푣1퐴 + 훼+ 푣3퐵.
For the above parameter space, there are two possible subcases in VCG model: one is
when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼, and 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 (the latter condition makes this an
inefficient allocation), then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 which is the Case I: A)i) from Proposition 9.
Since 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
The other one is when 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼, and 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼, then 푅푉 퐶퐺 =
푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 + 푣1퐵 − 푣3퐵 which is the Case I: A)iv) from Proposition 9. Since 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵,
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we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
Case 2: This is the symmetric case when 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣2퐴 < 푝
∗
1(global bidder wins license
퐴 with a loss), and 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼 (but loses license 퐵), then 푅푆퐴퐴 = 푣1퐵 + 훼+ 푣2퐴.
For the above parameter space, there are two possible subcases in VCG model: one is
when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴+훼, 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵+훼, and 푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼(the
latter condition makes this an inefficient allocation), then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 which is the
Case I: A)i) from Proposition 9. Since 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
The other one is when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼, and
푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼, then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼+ 푣1퐴− 푣2퐴 which is the Case I: A)iii)
from Proposition 9. Since 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
Then, we consider when there is type 2 exposure problem, there are two kinds of cases.
Case 1: When 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, and 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼(global bidder
wins license 퐴 and 퐵 with a loss), then 푅푆퐴퐴 = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
For the above parameter space, there are three possible subcases in VCG model: The first
one is when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴+훼, 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵+훼, and 푣2퐴+푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼,
then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 2(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼) − 푣2퐴 − 푣3퐵 which is the Case I: A)ii) from Proposition 9.
Since 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼 , we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
The second one is when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴 + 훼, 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼, and
푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼, then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼+ 푣1퐴− 푣2퐴 which is the Case I: A)iii)
from Proposition 9. Since 푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼 and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
The third one is when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴, and 푣2퐴+푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼, then 푅푉 퐶퐺 =
푣1퐵 + 훼 + 푣2퐴 which is the Case I: C) from Proposition 9. Since 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼
and 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴, we have, 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵 + 훼. So we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
Case 2: This is the symmetric of case 1 above. When 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼,
푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼(global bidder wins license 퐴 and 퐵 with a loss), then 푅푆퐴퐴 =
푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵.
For the above parameter space, there are three possible cases in VCG model: The first
one is when 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵+훼, 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴+훼, and 푣2퐴+푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼,
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then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 2(푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼) − 푣2퐴 − 푣3퐵 which is the Case I: A)ii) from Proposition 9.
Since 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
The second one is when 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵 + 훼, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼, and
푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼, then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵+훼+ 푣1퐵− 푣3퐵 which is the Case I: A)iv)
from Proposition 9. Since 푣2퐴+ 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴+ 푣1퐵 +훼 and 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
The third one is when 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼, then 푅푉 퐶퐺 =
푣1퐴 + 훼 + 푣3퐵which is the Case I: B) from Proposition 9. Since 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼
and 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵, we have, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴 + 훼. So we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴.
Proof of Proposition 8 When the allocation is inefficient (except for two types of
exposure problem) in SAA, then revenue in VCG model is greater than that in SAA, that
is, 푅푉 퐶퐺 > 푅푆퐴퐴.
There are two cases.
Case 1: Global bidder loses both licenses in SAA model, but wins both in VCG model.
When 푣3퐵 > 푝
∗
1 > 푣1퐵(global bidder loses licese 퐵), 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴(global bidder loses license 퐴),
and 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼(this condition makes an inefficient allocation), if 푣1퐴 > 푝
∗
1,
then 푅푆퐴퐴 = 푝
∗
1 + 푣1퐴 or if 푣1퐴 < 푝
∗
1, then 푅푆퐴퐴 = 푝
∗
1 + 푝
∗
1.
There is one corresponding possible subcase in VCG model which is the Case I: A)iv)
from Proposition 9. when 푣3퐵 > 푣1퐵, 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, and 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼, then
푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣2퐴 + 푣3퐵. When 푣1퐴 < 푝
∗
1, since 푣3퐵 > 푝
∗
1,and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 < 푅푆퐴퐴;
or when 푣1퐴 > 푝
∗
1, since 푣3퐵 > 푝
∗
1,and 푣2퐴 > 푣1퐴, we also have 푅푉 퐶퐺 > 푅푆퐴퐴.
Case 2: Global bidder wins license A and local bidder wins license B in SAA model.25
When 푣3퐵 > 푝
∗
1(global bidder loses licese 퐵), 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴(global bidder wins licese 퐴), 푣2퐴 > 푝
∗
1,
and 푣1퐴 + 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐴 + 푣1퐵 + 훼, then 푅푆퐴퐴 = 푝
∗
1 + 훼 + 푣2퐴.
In such case, there is one possible subcase in VCG model which is the Case II: B)iv) from
Proposition 9 when 푣3퐵 < 푣1퐵+훼, and 푣2퐴 < 푣1퐴, then we can derive 푣2퐴+푣3퐵 < 푣1퐴+푣1퐵+훼,
then 푅푉 퐶퐺 = 푣3퐵 + 푣2퐴. Since 푣3퐵 > 푝
∗
1, then we have 푅푉 퐶퐺 > 푅푆퐴퐴.
25Since we assume 푣1퐴 > 푣1퐵 , we do not have the case global bidder wins license B and local bidder license
A. If we remove the assumption, the proof can be written symmetrically.
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